Rigorous software testing is crucial for developing and maintaining high-quality code, making automated test generation a promising avenue for both improving software quality and boosting the effectiveness of code generation methods. However, while code generation with Large Language Models (LLMs) is an extraordinarily active research area, test generation remains relatively unexplored. We address this gap and investigate the capability of LLM-based Code Agents to formalize user issues into test cases. To this end, we propose a novel benchmark based on popular GitHub repositories, containing real-world issues, ground-truth bug-fixes, and golden tests. We find that LLMs generally perform surprisingly well at generating relevant test cases, with Code Agents designed for code repair exceeding the performance of systems designed specifically for test generation. Further, as test generation is a similar but more structured task than code generation, it allows for a more fine-grained analysis using issue reproduction rate and coverage changes, providing a dual metric for analyzing systems designed for code repair. Finally, we find that generated tests are an effective filter for proposed code fixes, doubling the precision of SWE-Agent.

Unsafe operations described in natural text lead to a lower rejection rate than thoseincodeformat.

Work was done when interned at Zhipu AI.

Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study adversarial alignment, and ask to what extent these models remain aligned when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force.

These profiles are fed back to the LLM, which then revises the code to reduce overhead.